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Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted
or Patented Products and the First Sale Doctrine
Herbert Hovenkamp *
Agency
Throughout the history of resale price maintenance manufacturers have used a
variety of devices to control the prices that intermediaries handling their products
charged downstream customers. 1 Among these are the manufacturer's designating
those handling its product as “agents” and authorizing them to convey its title in the
goods directly to consumers 2 or, in the case of patented or copyrighted products, to
“license” consumers to use the product for a “royalty” that the manufacturer specifies.
Patent and copyright holders have also attempted to specify prices in a manner that
purported to make transactions at lower prices infringements of the patent or copyright.
Such efforts have been largely unsuccessful.
Let us put patented and copyrighted goods aside for the moment and begin with
“ordinary” products, where the contract between the manufacturer and an intermediary
designates the latter as the former's “agent,” who promises to sell the manufacturerowned goods for no less than a specified price. The reasonableness and legality of a
contract so limiting the agent's pricing freedom is not automatically answered by the Dr.
Miles rule governing contracts with “independent” businesspersons. After all,
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

1

See also 8 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶1622-1627 (3d ed. 2010).

2

Although the next downstream party need not be the ultimate consumer, it simplifies exposition to
speak of “consumers” rather than to use more general or abstract descriptions.
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employment contracts requiring employees to charge only those prices specified by
their employer are lawful, notwithstanding their restraint of employees' freedom. That
result is usually phrased in terms not of the reasonableness of the restraint but of the
absence of any cognizable conspiracy. 3 The employee is regarded as “inside the firm,”
and thus the manager's and employee's “agreement” that the latter will charge a certain
price is regarded as a unilateral act.
In sum, given that resale price maintenance is assessed under §1 of the Sherman
Act, the legal issue can be phrased as one of the agent's capacity to conspire with its
principal over prices to consumers. In all events, the existence of a cognizable
conspiracy between principal and agent or its reasonableness depends upon policy
judgments about whether and in what circumstances agents should be regarded as part
of a principal's enterprise and thus as subject to internal direction about downstream
pricing without regard to the Dr. Miles rule.
The law on this question seemed settled in 1926 when the Supreme Court held in
General Electric that a manufacturer could lawfully fix the prices charged by its
“agents.” 4 That doctrine, however, was severely limited in 1964 by Simpson, 5 which
invoked the Dr. Miles condemnation notwithstanding the manufacturer's agency
3

See 7 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶1471-1472 (3d ed. 2010) (in press),
which explore the issue in detail and consider possible exceptions to the text statement. See, e.g.,
Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2009) (post-Leegin RPM decision;
agency agreement did not create Sherman Act conspiracy).
4
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The Court was careful to point out that a
patentee who manufactures the product protected by the patent and fails to retain its ownership in it
cannot control the price at which it is resold. Id. at 489.
5

Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Dr. Miles’ Orphans:
Vertical Conspiracy and Consignment in the Wake of Leegin (Working Paper, Feb. 20, 2010, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1556491).
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arrangements with a “vast” number of intermediaries whom the Court deemed to be
“independent businessmen.”

RPM and the First Sale Doctrine
When patented or copyrighted articles were made the subject of resale price
maintenance agreements, manufacturers sometimes labeled the product with notices
that stated that the dealers who bought them were “licensed” to resell only at specified
prices. The manufacturers sued those who sold for less as infringers. Rather than
obtaining or enforcing any contractual promise by dealers, as in Dr. Miles,
manufacturers claimed that such notices defined the extent of the license they granted
purchasers to use their patents or copyrights and that reselling for a lower price
departed from that license and thus infringed the patent or copyright. 5.1
Such claims have been read very narrowly by the Supreme Court. In its 1908
Bobbs-Merrill decision, the Court held that a retailer who had sold a book for less than
the specified price did not infringe the publisher's copyright, notwithstanding the
publisher's notice declaring such a sale to be an infringement. 6 Although the copyright

5.1

For fuller exploration of these issues, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and
Competitive Harm, ___ NYU Annual Survey of American Law ___ (2010) (in press), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540527 (Feb., 2010).
6

Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). This decision, as well as others dealing with resale
price maintenance where patents, copyrights, or other intellectual property are involved, are explored in
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, & Christopher R. Leslie, IP and Antitrust: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law §§24.1c, 24.2d (2d ed. 2010). On
copyright, the rationale of the first sale limitation is qualified if the underlying product is licensed rather
than sold, and the license in question is worded and displayed in such a fashion that the purchaser can be
said to have assented to it. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (shrinkwrap
license enforceable if purchaser/licensee of software had chance to read it before opening software
package); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, 846 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
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statute precluded others from publishing the book, it did not limit subsequent disposition
of books published and sold by the copyright holder. To add to the publisher's “right of
exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales
must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the
statute.”7
The Court did not then rule upon the enforceability of a contractual promise to
charge a specified price, although it later did so in Dr. Miles. To be sure, patented or
copyrighted articles might be distinguished from ordinary goods, but the Supreme Court
has ruled since 1873 that patented articles pass outside the statutory monopoly once
sold, and there are no grounds for giving greater power to copyright holders. In Adams,
before the Sherman Act was passed, the plaintiff had rights under a patent to
manufacture certain coffin lids within ten miles of Boston. 8 He sold lids to the defendant
undertaker, who used some of them outside the ten-mile limit. The Court found no
infringement:
[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole
value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he
(“first sale” doctrine did not apply when Microsoft licensed software to a third party who re-licensed to
plaintiff); Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 WL 1683386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000), aff'd, 793 A.2d 1048
(Conn. 2002) (purchaser or computer from third party implicitly accepted license to Microsoft Windows
that was bundled with the machine). Other decisions continue to follow its rationale. E.g., Klocek v.
Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (purchaser not bound by terms of shrinkwrap license;
discussing the split in decisions). See 1 7 U.S.C. §109. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of
Contract, 67 Md. L. Rev. 616 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999).
7
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351.
8

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
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parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the language
of the court, passes without the limit of the [statutory patent]
monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the
act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims
for use of the invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is
open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on
account of the monopoly of the patentees. 9
Similarly, the Keeler Court found no infringement when a dealer knowingly
purchased a patented product from a manufacturer licensed to make and sell it only in
Michigan and then resold it in Massachusetts. 10 The Court declared that
one who buys patented articles of manufacture from one
authorized to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property
in such articles, unrestricted in time or place…. The conclusion
reached does not deprive a patentee of his just rights, because no
article can be unfettered from the claim of his monopoly without
paying its tribute. 11
The principles of these early patent cases and of Bobbs-Merrill were followed when
the Court dealt with alleged patent infringement by dealers reselling patented products
at discounted prices. In Bauer a patentee-manufacturer “licensed” dealers to resell only

9

Id. at 456.

10

Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895).

11

Id. at 666-667.
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at specified prices, claiming that resale is a “use” of the patented article that is subject to
the patentee's control because the patent grants the pantentee “the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the invention.”12 Discounted resale prices would then be an
unlicensed use and thus an infringement. The Court disagreed, holding that “it is a
perversion of terms to call the transaction in any sense a license to use the invention,” 13
and quoting from Adams the proposition that selling the goods removes them from the
patent monopoly. 14
The Supreme Court found it equally easy to rebuff the more complicated scheme in
the Straus case. 15 The Court described the “license notice” attached to each patented
machine as declaring
that only the right to use the machine “for demonstrating
purposes” is granted to “distributors” (wholesale dealers), but that
these “distributors” may assign a like right “to the public” or to
“regularly licensed Victor dealers” (retailers) “at the dealers' regular
discount royalty”; that the “dealers” may convey the “license to use
the machine” only when a “royalty” of not less than $200 shall have
been paid, and upon the “consideration” that all of the conditions of
the “license” shall have been observed; that the title to the machine
shall remain in the plaintiff which shall have the right to repossess it
12

Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).

13

Id. at 16.

14

Id. at 18.

15

Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
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upon breach of any of the conditions of the notice, by paying to the
user the amount paid by him less five per cent for each year that
the machine has been used. 16
The Court noted that “the full price, called a ‘royalty,’ was paid before the
[manufacturer] parted with the possession of it,” 17 and concluded that this “scheme of
distribution is not a system designed to secure to the plaintiff and to the public a
reasonable use of its machines, within the grant of the patent laws, but is in substance
and in fact a mere price-fixing enterprise.”18 Once again, the patent laws did not make
price cutting an infringement. In the Ethyl19 and Univis 20 cases, patentees had issued
licenses to wholesalers and retailers, setting the price at which each could sell to the
next party in the chain. In both instances, the Supreme Court held that patent law did
not protect the manufacturers and applied Dr. Miles to condemn the arrangement.
The Ethyl Company held a patent on an “anti-knock” fluid that the company made
and sold to gasoline refiners, who incorporated it in their gas. The resulting mixture was
also subject to Ethyl's patent. The refiners were restricted from selling to jobbers other
than those licensed by Ethyl, and jobbers were restricted from selling to gasoline
stations other than those approved by Ethyl. Although such customer restrictions might
16

Id. at 494-495.

17

Id. at 500.

18

Id. at 501.

19

Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D.
Janis Mark A. Lemley, and Christopher R. Leslie, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
Applied to Intellectual Property Law §§24.1c, 24.2d(2d ed. 2010).
20

United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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be valid standing alone, the Court deemed them fatally contaminated by Ethyl's unlawful
purpose: Ethyl withdrew or threatened to withdraw its approval or “licenses” from
jobbers and retailers selling below certain prices. 21 Controlling the jobbers' prices and
distribution policies was held to fall outside Ethyl's patent, which, the Court declared,
was “exhausted” no later than upon the refiners' sales of the patented mixture to
jobbers. 22
Similarly, the Univis Company sold unfinished blank lenses to firms that ground and
completed them before selling them to other dealers or to the public. The finished
product was subject to Univis's patent. Univis purported to license each intermediary
who finished the product or otherwise handled it and to fix their resale prices. The Court
held that
where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished
by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his
invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article.
The reward he has demanded and received is for the article and
the invention which it embodies and which his vendee is to practice
upon it. He has thus parted with his right to assert the patent
monopoly with respect to it and is no longer free to control the price
at which it may be sold either in its unfinished or finished form. No
21

Ethyl Gasoline, 309 U.S. at 452-454.
Id. at 457. The Court emphasized that Ethyl's business was selling patented fluid, and not the
gasoline mixture.
22
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one would doubt that if the patentee's licensee had sold the blanks
to a wholesaler or finishing retailer, without more, the purchaser
would not infringe by grinding and selling them. The added
stipulation by the patentee fixing resale prices derives no support
from the patent and must stand on the same footing under the
Sherman Act as like stipulations with respect to unpatented
commodities. 23
With the patent put aside, the arrangement violated Dr. Miles' prohibition of resale
price maintenance. 24
The first sale, or patent “exhaustion,” doctrine operates only as a limitation on the
rights created under the relevant intellectual property statutes; it does not independently
create or modify antitrust liability. This distinction between removal of the intellectual
property immunity and the creation of antitrust liability is particularly important in rule of
reason cases. To illustrate, suppose that patentee General Electric licensed
Westinghouse to manufacture light bulbs under GE's patent. The license agreement
stipulated that (1) Westinghouse could not charge a wholesale price higher than $1.00
each for the finished bulbs; and (2) resellers who purchased from Westinghouse could
not sell the bulbs to consumers for a price higher than $1.50. As interpreted in the

23

Univis, 316 U.S. at 250-251. Note that this language implies that Ethyl had exhausted its patent
rights when it sold its patented fluid to the refiners; because such fluid had no use except to be combined
with gasoline, the refiner would have an implied license to make the patented combination, just as those
who purchase blanks from Univis do not infringe its patent over the finished product by grinding and
finishing the blanks.
24

The Univis Court relied on United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) and Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). See Univis, 316 U.S. at 251, 252, 254.
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General Electric case, 1 the Patent Act itself authorizes the first agreement, stipulating
the wholesale price charged by Westinghouse, and thus immunizes it from antitrust
liability. However, under the exhaustion limitation, the Patent Act would create no
immunity for the second agreement, setting the maximum retail price, for this agreement
applies to a transaction beyond the original sale. Nevertheless, the loss of immunity
does not itself create antitrust liability. In this case the arrangement in question imposes
maximum resale prices. Such arrangements are treated under the rule of reason and
are only rarely unlawful. 2
In its 2008 Quanta Computer decision, the Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the
patent exhaustion rule (that is, the first sale doctrine) and held that it applies to method
patents as well. 3 Under that doctrine, a patentee who has sold a patented articles gives
up control over it and cannot take advantage of the patent laws to impose further
restraints on it; as a result, someone who repurchases the article from the initial
purchaser and who violates such a restriction cannot be guilty of patent infringement.
It has always been the case, however, that the IP right holder can enter into at least
some contracts with either the first or the subsequent purchaser controlling the
1

See 272 U.S. 476 .

2

See 8 Antitrust Law ¶1635 (3d ed. 2010) (in press). Before the decision in GTE Sylvania that
applied the rule of reason to vertical nonprice restraints, they were also illegal per se. During that period
exhaustion was frequently applied so as to condemn vertical nonprice restraints involving intellectual
property licenses. E.g., American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enters., 362 F. Supp. 32, 38-39
(N.D. Ohio. 1973) (license to manufacturer restricted its sales to an assigned territory and required it to
impose similar restraints upon its distributors; latter held not enforceable: “territorial restrictions beyond
the first sale are not sanctioned by 35 U.S.C. §261). Accord Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, 448 F.2d 872, 879-880
(2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1207-1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(concluding that even under Sylvania it was unlawful for patentee to impose field-of-use restriction on
subsequent purchaser).
3

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).

Hovenkamp

RPM, Agency, IP and First Sale

Dec. 2010, Page 11

disposition or use of the protected good. The Copyright Act contemplates the first sale
doctrine, and its legislative history contemplates the use of contracts to get around
some of its limitations. 4 In Quanta the Supreme Court refused to decide the issue with
respect to the Patent Act, stating in a footnote:
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta [the
indirect purchaser] does not necessarily limit LGE's [the patentee's]
other contract rights. LGE's complaint does not include a breach-ofcontract claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract
damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to
eliminate patent damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed
Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect
himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the
purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we express
no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise
as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent
meaning and effect of the patent laws”). 5

There is no reason to think that Quanta upset the status quo on the contract issue.
Thus, a patent infringement action to enforce a resale price maintenance restriction

4

17 U.S.C. §109; and see H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5693. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Maryland L. Rev. 616, 663 & nn.
220–221 (2008) (“although Congress intended to allow parties to contract around the first-sale doctrine, it
would require that such waivers be enforced through breach of contract actions, not through copyright
infringement actions.”).
5

Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2122 n. 7.
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placed on a patented article could not be maintained once the patentee has sold the
article. However, a contract entered into with the first or presumably any subsequent
purchaser of a patented article and imposing a resale price would likely be enforceable
unless it violated antitrust's rule of reason. Of course, all ordinary contract law
requirements would apply, including privity of contract with the person against whom
enforcement is sought. And the remedy for breach would be a contract remedy, not a
cause of action for patent infringement.

